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Introduction: 
The main purpose of this paper is  introducing Inflation targeting as framework  for the monetary 
policy while focusing on the Egyptian economy to be able to answer our research question which 
is "Is  Egypt willing to embrace inflation targeting as a framework for its monetary system ? . 
The intuition beyond choosing to study inflation targeting framework is attributed to the fact that 
since inflation (which is the increase in the overall price level) is considered to be one of the 
most crucial issues that great attention should be paid towards it by all the countries, because 
high and volatile inflationary rate has negative effects on the economic efficiency leading to  
distorting relative prices , eliminate saving , inhibit investment, encourage capital outflows as 
local investors will invest their money in foreign assets, precious metals or real estate, restrain 
growth and development making economic planning a horror  and encouraging social and 
political instability 
In addition, developed and developing countries that have witnessed high inflation rates during 
1970s and 1980s have suffered from deterioration in their economic growth, acting against their 
external competitiveness, inhibiting employment. 
Henceforth, governments all over the world have concluded that the major assistance the central 
banks can present for a satisfactory economic performance over the long run is to make inflation 
as well as inflation expectations fixed at a low level through adopting "Inflation Targeting" as a 
framework for monetary policy used to control price level increase. 
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy, in which the central bank estimates or target 
inflation rate while making it clear for the public and then try to drive real inflation towards the 
target inflation rate using interest rate changes in addition to other monetary instruments, that it 
will lead to achieving price stability. 
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Inflation targeting was primarily adopted by New Zealand in 1990, where inflation target has 
been very successful leading to achieve price stability , lessening long term inflation beneath the 
levels that should have been attained before adoption of inflation targeting in addition to 
attaining economic growth, accordingly such results have attracted  other countries to embark 
adopting inflation targeting as a framework for their monetary policy ,  thus New Zealand was 
followed by Advanced Courtiers such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, 
Australia, and Switzerland, moving to Emerging countries such as Chile, Brazil, Korea, Thailand 
and South Africa and Transition countries such as Czech republic, Poland and Hungary, whereby 
this countries have experienced satisfactory economic performance represented in low inflation 
rate as well as steady economic growth. 
Since inflation targeting has been widely used framework for monetary policy in most of the 
developed and developing countries, Egypt is one of the countries that has the potential to 
embrace inflation targeting as a framework for its monetary policy evidenced by the central bank 
of Egypt (CBE) has announced in 2005 its intention to adopt inflation targeting regime as a 
framework for its monetary policy once the fundamental prerequisites are achieved  (IMF, 2007; 
CBE, 2005). 
Moreover, the central bank of Egypt (CBE) mentioned that it is currently applying implicit 
inflation that will be explicitly announced once the CBE finalize building up its inflation-
targeting framework in collaboration with the IMF. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 1 reviews the literature of inflation targeting 
framework regarding what is inflation target, its prerequisites, advantages and disadvantages in 
addition to the transmission channels. Section 2 describes the way of designing and 
implementing inflation targeting framework , where section 3  displays  success stories of some 
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countries experience that have  adopted  inflation targeting, moving to section 4 which which 
elaborates Inflation targeting in Egypt and finally section 5 which answers our research question 
regarding is Egypt wiling to embrace inflation target for its monetary framework ? Then, this 
paper ends with a brief conclusion. 
Section one: Literature Review 
1.1 Why Inflation Targeting  
Monetary policy is the process through which the government, central bank, or monetary 
authority of a country manages money supply, availability of money as well as cost of money or 
interest rate seeking to accomplish a set of objective related to growth and stable economy. 
The main objective of monetary policy is achieving price stability followed by full employment, 
local financial steadiness as well as normal operations of foreign transactions. 
To achieve price stability, different tools are used such as inflation targeting, monetary targeting 
as well as exchange rate targeting, whereby inflation targeting is considered the mastering 
framework used that has currently by been adopted by many central banks to manage the 
monetary policy aiming to curb the increase in the price level and as a result of the failure of 
other monetary policy regimes such as monetary targeting as well as exchange rate targeting. 
Worth to mention that monetary targeting is a strategy that many central banks started targeting 
the growth of money supply to curb inflation, this approach is valid in case the central banks can 
control the money supply in a reasonable way and if the growth of money is related  to inflation  
steadily, Eventually, monetary targeting had an inadequate success because of the instability of 
the demand for money due to financial markets usual innovations. 
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One the other hand , Exchange -rate Targeting is a strategy where the Central banks used the 
currency peg as a nominal anchor that links the value of the local currency to another currency of 
a low inflation Co, which indicates that the country's monetary policy was the  same as the 
country to which it is pegged, thus restricting the Central bank capability in responding to shocks 
such as any alteration in trade terms or changes in real interest rate , thus many countries started 
to adopt flexible exchange rates leading them to look foe another nominal anchor . 
Accordingly, several countries having flexible exchange rates started to target inflation directly , 
according to their understanding to the "Transmission mechanism "from the central banks policy 
instruments to inflation (e.g. interest rates). 
1.2 What is inflation targeting?  
The most appropriate definition for inflation targeting is given by Ben Bernanke et al. (1999) 
which is " Inflation targeting is a monetary policy framework having the following features: 
Public declaration of official quantities targets for the inflation rate over one or more time 
horizons, in addition to clear acknowledgment that low and stable inflation is the prime long 
term goal of the monetary policy, among the other crucial features of inflation targeting are 
effective efforts to communicate with the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary 
authorities and in many cases , mechanisms that enhance the central banks accountability for 
achieving these objectives. 
This definition can be packed up through adding independence tool for the central bank as well 
as the shortage of an explicit intermediate target, since all the factors influencing inflation are 
taken into consideration. 
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1.3 Advantages of Inflation Targeting 
Ensuring and Preserving price stability through reducing inflation as well as making it less 
volatility . 
Improving central bank accountability to achieve inflation target. 
Inflation targeting entails central bank independence in managing monetary policy , where by 
independence we mean Central bank independence  from the government, in addition to 
awarding the central bank full and exclusive power in choosing and implementing the rules of 
the monetary policy. 
Transparency of the monetary policy through communicating with the public the monetary 
policy purposes and decisions. 
In contrast to exchange rate peg, inflation targeting empowers monetary policy to concentrate on 
local considerations and to react to shocks in the local economy. 
In contrary to monetary targeting, inflation targeting has the advantage that a steady relation 
between money and inflation is not necessary for its success, albeit inflation targeting utilizes all 
accessible information to set the supreme settings for the tools of monetary policy. 
Inflation targeting can be simply understood by the public; accordingly, it is very transparent 
framework. 
Owing to that an explicit numerical target for inflation augments the central bank accountability, 
thus inflation-targeting framework minimize the probability that the central bank may drop in the 
trap of time inconsistency. 
In addition, given that the source of time - inconsistency is found in political pressures on the 
central bank to carry out additional expansionary monetary policy, inflation targeting has the 
benefit of concentrating the political argument on what a central bank can do in the long run 
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which is managing inflation rather than on what it cannot do like enhancing output growth, 
reducing unemployment, augmenting external competitiveness via monetary policy  
For inflation targeting to be able to achieve theses outcomes, there must exist a strong 
institutional commitment to make price stability the main aim of the central bank,  
Moreover, inflation targeting regimes put too much load in making monetary policy transparent 
and to preserve regular channels of communication with the public  
As demonstrated in Mishkin and Posen (1997), and in Bernanke, et. al.  (1999), 
Inflation targeting central banks have regular communications with the government and their 
officials take the advantage of every opportunity to make speeches to the public about their 
monetary policy strategy, in addition, inflation-targeting central banks have conducted additional 
steps by publishing reports to present their point of views about the past and future performance 
of inflation and monetary policy. 
Since inflation, targeting regimes are associated with the transparency of policy, which has 
tended to make the central bank highly accountable towards the public  
Fixing long run inflation expectations to inflation target. 
 Via inflation targeting, the market can evaluate the central banks performance.  
 
1.4 Disadvantages of Inflation Targeting 
As mentioned in Mishkin (1999) and in Bernanke, et al. (1999), 
Inflation targeting is very rigid 
Inflation targeting permits too much discretion. 
Inflation targeting can raise output volatility. 
Inflation targeting may reduce economic growth  
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Adding to the previously stated disadvantage, there are others shortfalls to the inflation targeting   
Inflation targeting cannot avoid fiscal domination, as in the long run, huge fiscal deficits will 
drive inflation targeting regime to collapse. 
Flexible exchange rate entailed by inflation targeting can lead to financial volatility. 
Unlike exchange rates and monetary frameworks, inflation rate under inflation targeting regime 
cannot be easily managed by monetary authorities (central banks). 
Inflation targeting can lead to fragile central bank accountability, since inflation is not easily 
controlled by monetary authorities. 
Inflation targeting is not adequate to guarantee fiscal discipline or avoid fiscal dominance, 
governments can keep following irresponsible fiscal policy wile applying inflation targeting, 
subsequently large fiscal deficits will break down inflation targeting regime. 
1.5 Motives for adopting IT   
Since IT has achieved a quick widespread in various countries, led to the question what are the 
motives beyond countries decision to shift to inflation targeting? these motives can be 
demonstrated via two factors, which are: 
1.5.1 IT deemed to be a way to reform monetary policy 
Nowadays, there is a huge consensus that a monetary policy framework is effective as long as it's 
capable of attaining the goal of price stability  
In this respect, a nominal anchor of monetary policy is essential for price stability since it ties 
down public predictions about price 
Consequently, the effectiveness of a monetary policy is decided by the effectiveness of the 
embodied nominal anchor that send the accurate message to all practitioners about the potential 
behavior of the price level 
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Hence, IT is a way to enhance monetary policy by anchoring public predictions of inflation 
around a declared target of inflation. 
1.5.2 IT does not worsen economic performance 
In literature, there is no accord between economists regarding the contribution of IT in the 
economic performance  
E.g. Truman (2003, 33) contributed the widespread of IT specifically in the nineties decade to 
the appropriate global macroeconomic environment during this period which contributed in 
awarding a good reputation and a good beginning to the inflation targeting regime. 
Albeit, disagreement between economists regarding the role of IT in the economic performance 
may be referred to the inconsistent results of empirical studies. 
On one side, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) discovered that IT is helpful specifically on 
lessening the inflation rate , decreasing the sacrifice ratio and output volatility , steering inflation 
predictions and handling inflation shocks in a better way , strengthening central bank 
independence as well as enhancing communication , transparency and accountability  
Neumann, Manfred J.M., and Jurgen Von Hagen (2002) reached similar results concerning 
inflation volatility and output.  Also, Landerretche, Oscar, et al. (2001) found alike consequences  
regarding output sacrifice , industrial output volatility and lessening inflation forecast errors 
according to a country VAR’s models.   
On the other side, some studies discovered that IT did not add to the economic performance  
Bernanke, et al. (1999), demonstrated that applying IT was not beneficial regarding the cost and 
pace of price stabilization 
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Through comparing 7 inflation marketers to 13 non targeters Laurence, Ball, and Niamh, 
Sheridan (2003) found that the performance of both groups have been enhanced and there is no 
proof that IT foster performance 
Though , Hu, Yifan (2003) followed mild point of view throughout the outcome of 66 countries 
from the period 1980-2000 , where the author found weak support regarding that applying IT 
foster the trade-off between inflation and output volatility , even though IT doesn’t represents a 
helpful position in enhancing the performance of inflation and output  
However, the obvious view in the empirical studies is that IT doesn’t deteriorate economic 
performance in the countries adopting inflation targeting . 
1.6 Inflation targeting prerequisites 
The common inflation targeting preconditions that are desirable by the majority of the 
economists (Khan 2003, p. 10; Truman, 2003, p. 49; Batini et al., 2006, p. 18; Jonas & Mishkin 
2003, p. 6) are classified into two categorized: 
1.6.1 Institutional prerequisites, which are:  
 Commitment to price stability. 
 Independence of the central bank 
 Macroeconomic stability 
 A strong  and well -developed financial system 
 Monetary policy transparency and central bank accountability  
 Absence of fiscal dominance 
 Coordination between monetary and fiscal policies 
 Exchange rate flexibility. 
 Transparency and Accountability.  
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1.6.2-Technical prerequisites: 
 Selecting a suitable price index that represents the purchasing ability of money , in addition 
to being  simply understandable by the public , in relation to which the inflation target is 
determined  
 Clear setting of a quantitative target with the accepted variation band and of the time horizon 
over which the target will be followed , owing to the imperfection of monetary authorities in 
controlling  inflation rate appears the need to determine a bandwidth, considering that a 
narrow band means a strong commitment of the central bank to follow price stability goal , 
albeit it may weaken the  credibility of the monetary authority and may encourage instability 
in the monetary policy tools to achieve a given movement in inflation rate . 
 Concerning determining the time horizon of the target , this depends on the primary inflation 
rate and the length of the transmission mechanism  
 The central bank's prediction of inflation means that the central bank must react to the gab 
between the inflation prediction and the target, before the inflationary stresses become 
obvious. 
Considering that the three crucial preconditions for inflation targeting that are highlighted in 
most of the literature are as hereunder:  
1-Factual (de facto) independence of the central bank. 
The independence of the central bank has to be de facto and not only de jure , where Complete 
legal independence of the CB (including independence of the objective and tool independence) is 
a debatable issue among economists; however factual instrument independence of the CB is a 
crucial condition as a precondition for applying inflation targeting  
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The central bank should have the freedom to select the suitable instruments and alter them 
whenever it is essential without suffering from any stresses from the government. 
In addition, the central bank should have the techniques and technicians that enable it from 
attaining its goals without having the need for external intervention. 
That is, the government may plan the inflation targets and their acceptance intervals and delivers 
it to the central bank to start attaining it, however the implementation of inflation targeting 
should be achieved solely by the central bank without receiving any instructions from any entity, 
accordingly the existence of government representatives in the monetary policy committee as a 
voting member should be banned.  
Worth noting that if there is fiscal domination, thus the CB independence is not factual even if 
the CB is having both legal independence of instrument and there are no government 
representatives in the MPC.  
Hence the existence of fiscal domination make it hard for in any country to adopt IT framework 
The fiscal dominance can be noticeable through the official responsibility of the CB to finance 
government budget deficits. 
Masson et al. (1998), Debelle et al. (1998) and Khan (2003) mentioned additional factor for 
fiscal dominance which is the capital market shallowness  
To sum up, the factual independence of a central bank can be represented in three main pillars 
which are: 
 CB legal instrument independence 
 No presence for the government representatives as voting members in the monetary policy 
committee (MPC). 
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 Non existence for fiscal dominance represented in no commitment for the central bank to 
finance budget deficit , while financial markets must have sufficient capability to absorb 
government debt such as treasury bills. 
 
2-The main goal of monetary policy should be commitment to price stability  
The central bank main goal should be concentration in attaining price stability without targeting 
any other goals such as exchange rate or employment. 
On one hand, if the monetary policy was committed to other targets it will be confined to those 
goals and as a result it will not succeed in attaining the declared inflation target. 
On the other hand, the public will not guarantee that the monetary authorities are giving the full 
attention to inflation targets, which in return will worsen the public expectations regarding the 
future of inflation due to the doubt regarding the credibility of the declared target. 
Yet, the central bank should interfere to stop any undesirable effects due to the variation in 
macroeconomic variables on the future inflation. (Khan, 2003, p. 10).  
The commitment to attain price stability as a crucial objective of monetary policy entails some 
degree of CB accountability regarding inflation targeting completion. 
The lessons from the international experiences as stated by Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 38, p. 296) 
delivered two shapes of accountability through:  
 Fist, comparing inflation results with the target  
 Second, through CB commitment to present the public with a persuading rationale for the 
selection of the policy that they are following 
Since inflation react to followed policy after some time lags, in addition that inflation targets are 
barely attained accurately in the short term. 
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Thus the second shape is considered to be the solely option for preserving accountability 
Practically, most CBs favor to be more transparent and credible to the public through declaring 
the reasons for missing the target (exception from the commitment to accomplish the inflation 
target) which clarify two things which are  
 Why accountability of CBs is less formalized in practice. 
 Why  a  transparent monetary policy is very essential not only as a tool to anchor public 
anticipation around a declared inflation target but also as a tool of CB accountability to the 
public 
To sum up, an obligation to price stability entails two main factors: 
 A CB should not aim to target any variables other than inflation rate. 
 CB has to be transparent to the public regarding the exceptions of inflation target, meaning 
that the CB should declare inflation target escape clauses. 
Accordingly, transparency is a practical tool making the CB accountable to the public in 
attaining the inflation targeting. 
3-Anticipating capability: 
Due to the fact that there is time lag between the alteration of monetary policy tools and their 
related impacts on inflation, an IT framework has to be followed in a forward -looking behavior 
Where the present alteration of monetary policy tools shall be created on a systematic evaluation 
of the future trend of inflation. 
Accordingly, the adoption of an IT framework through declaring various targets for inflation to 
be implemented in the future and the method to be carried on towards achieving those targets 
entails (Debelle et al., 1998, pp. 3-4): 
 Designing in advance a model for predicting inflation and inflation projection. 
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 The CB should have apparent idea regarding its monetary policy transmission mechanism 
and the related lags. 
 Availability of comprehensive high quality and modernized database of the economic 
variables  
1.7 How does Inflation Target work? 
According to (Sarwat Jahan, 2011) 
 First, the central bank projects the future pathway of inflation. 
 After that comparing the projection with the target inflation rate, where the target rate is 
the inflation rate that the government considers matching with the economy. 
 The disparity among them sets to what extent the monetary policy has to be altered. 
 Some countries have selected inflation targets with regular ranges around a midpoint, 
 Where others have set only a target rate or a ceiling limit to inflation 
 In short , all countries set their inflation targets in low single digits 
 Inflation target close to zero is not preferable since it will not permit real interest rate to 
decrease sufficiently to enhance overall demand while the central bank is attempting to 
foster the economy. 
1.8 Monetary Policy Transmission channels 
Monetary policy transmission mechanisms are the process through which variation in monetary 
policy decisions influence the economic growth rate and/or inflation rate (Taylor 1995). 
According to Mukherjee and Bhatt acharya (2011), the literature highlighted four key 
transmission channels through which Monetary policy affects demand which are: 
 The conventional interest rate channel; 
 The credit supply channel 
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 Exchange rate channel 
 The asset price channel 
Transmission channels under Inflation Targeting: 
A well understanding to the monetary policy transmission mechanism is a precondition for the 
successful adoption of inflation targeting. 
The prime monetary policy tool under inflation targeting is the short term interest rate 
 The first step of the transmission process: when alteration in the policy rate causes 
movements in the retail interest rate which is the commercial bank deposit and lending rates. 
 The second step: the alteration in the retail rates influences private consumption and 
investment and accordingly aggregate demand. 
 The third step: alteration in aggregate demand influence the level of activity in the local 
economy, thereby influencing the inflation rate in the last step of the monetary policy 
transmission process. 
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Section Two: Design and Implementation of Inflation Targeting 
Recognizing the fruitful benefits of inflation targeting depends mainly on how well the IT 
strategy is designed and implemented. 
There are two main advantage of Inflation targeting which are: Transparency and flexibility 
Transparency: means obvious and timely communication of policy objectives plans to the 
public, the purpose from ensuring policy transparency: 
 Raise the public understanding regarding what monetary policy can and cannot do. 
 Decrease of economic and financial doubt. 
 Enhancing the accountability towards the government. 
Flexibility: it is the central bank ability to respond in a good way to the short run 
macroeconomic development within the restrictions imposed by the inflation targeting 
framework. 
Over the long run, transparency often contributes to flexibility; albeit on the short run applying 
operational choices that foster transparency sometimes lead to minimizing flexibility and vice 
versa. 
Therefore in designing the inflation targeting framework, the important issue is to balance 
between transparency and flexibility. 
2.1 Operational Issues  
2.1.1-Which measure of inflation should be used? 
The first stage in designing an inflation target strategy is to determine the price index that its rate 
of variation will be targeted. 
To achieve maximum transparency, the selected price index has to be well known to the public, 
wide ranging and timely. 
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To achieve maximum flexibility, the index has to rule out variation in prices existing in small 
sectors and sudden price jumps that may affect the core inflation "e. g an increase in the value 
added tax or sales tax", the selected index has to exclude at least the effect of the first round due 
to such prices variation. 
Almost all inflation targeting CBs have chosen CPI to measure inflation rate, as it ignores 
specific volatile components to concentrate on core inflation. 
2.1.2-What numerical value should the target have? 
To determine a numerical value for an inflation target, "Price Stability" has to be the CB's main 
concern in achieving their policy objective. 
Price stability can be defined according to Federal Chairman Alan Green Span as a very low 
inflation rate to an extent that it is not paid an attention by business & households in planning 
their decisions, albeit this definition doesn't assist in determining inflation targets. 
On the contrary, a strict definition of price stability proposes an inflation rate equal or very 
closes to zero. 
There are significant economic risks to targeting inflation at a very low level as well as targeting 
inflation at too high level. 
For example: Akerlof ,Dickens ,and Perry (1996) showed that if nominal wages are inflexible to 
decline , thus reducing real wages can takes place through inflation, though with an extremely 
low inflation rate , reduction in real wages can’t happen as a reply to the reduction in labor 
demand causing a rise in unemployment. 
Additional argument against targeting inflation rate equal to zero is that such policy drive the 
economy towards deflation, generating severe liquidity and solvency problems worsening the 
economic contraction (Bernanke and James 1991, Mishkin, 1991). 
22 
 
To sum up, undershooting a zero IT (deflation) is costly than overshooting a zero inflation target. 
From that, we can propose that inflation targeting has to be set around 1%-3% per annum, where 
this is deemed to the common practice of all inflation targeting CB's. 
Consequently, one of the advantages of the inflation targeting is that it presents a floor as well as 
ceiling for Inflation rate. 
2.1.3. What Horizons? 
Inflation target can be determined for one or more horizons. 
Noting that targets less than one year or more than four years has no meaning, justified in light of 
the short tem horizon, inflation is out of the monetary policy control and for the long horizon, 
distant target would have little credibility. 
Although from 1-4 years, CB choice of target affects the tradeoff between transparency and 
flexibility. 
The more tightly is the target, the less uncertainty the Central bank communication with the 
public, but the greater the restraints on Central Bank liberty of action in the short run. 
2.1.4-A Point or a Range? 
Following the choice of the horizon and the numerical values of targets, Inflation Targeting 
Central Bank has some caution about whether to declare its target as a single point or as a range 
around some midpoint. 
Such choice depends on what are the factors affecting the expectations and how the public will 
react to a target miss. 
In case the central bank decided to declare a range for its target, in this case a narrower range 
communicates more commitment by the central bank to arrive at its inflation goal than does a 
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wider range, albeit as per the usual tradeoff, it diminishes the bank ability to reply to unexpected 
events. 
Unavoidable errors in managing inflation may lead inflation outside its range despite the Central 
Bank best efforts. 
Worth stressing that credibility damage as a result of missing a target range is greater than 
missing a target point.  
The spreading of the target range reflects the central bank evaluation of ambiguity surrounding 
the effects of its policy.  
Some authors have recognized that the uncertainty accompanied with high inflation (e.g. 
Haldane and salmon (1995), and Stevens and Debelle (1995) entail a wider range on the order of 
5-6%. 
While, a broader range might lead the public and the markets to doubt the CB commitment to IT, 
It remains to be seen whether doubt about inflation will be as high under IT as it has been in the 
past. 
As long as public are expecting the CB to control inflationary pressures, accordingly the 
forecasting and management of inflation may be improved. 
Lately , there was a noticeable decrease in the volatility of inflation in the majority of industrial 
countries even if they are inflation targeters or not  
2.1.5-What information should be used in policy making? 
Once the CB has determined its Inflation Targeting, it turns to the practical problem of reaching 
the target. So, what information should be used to make inflation among the preferred range? 
The answer to this question is “any information related to the forecasting of inflation”. 
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Inflation targeting Central Banks have depended more on variables presenting helpful 
information about the situation of the economy known as information variables or indicator 
variables. 
An example of information variables utilized by several Inflation targeting CB (especially 
Canada, Sweden and New Zealand) is “Monetary Condition index”. 
Monetary Condition index is a weighted combination of interest and exchange rates which is 
thought to help the Central Bank decides what the future path of inflation is likely to be.  
2.1.6-When deviations from the target should be allowed? 
Inflation targeting is  sometimes missed and some of the misses are as result of decisions by 
monetary authorities, deciding whether to alter the target or not depends mainly on the type of 
the shock striking the economy. 
e.g.  An aggregate supply shock such as an increase in oil prices that may lead to a conflict 
between stabilizing output and employment in the short run and stabilizing inflation in the long 
run, therefore targeting a price index that ignores first round effects of supply shock can enhance 
this conflict. 
Though a supply shock that is resulting from unexpected sources may give reason for missing or 
altering previously announced Inflation targeting. 
2.1.7-When is the best time to start implementing Inflation Targeting? 
It is exciting that Inflation Targeting has been presented at times of when inflation was already 
low and decreasing rather than at times when inflation was increasing and uncontrollable. 
2.2 Second Communication Issues of Inflation Targeting : 
One of the advantages of IT is that it enhances the transparency and accountability of monetary 
policy, to attain this advantage, it entails answering a number of essential questions. 
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2.2.1-What should be communicated to the public? 
The central bank has to introduce data about the economy, the banks' monetary policy as well as 
its policy intention and communicate the justification for adopting Inflation targeting and the 
policy strategy itself. 
In addition to communicating the current outlook for the economy and inflation indicators 
reports comprising private sector predictions and central bank forecasts and introducing progress 
reports on its success or failure in reaching its targets while illustrating why a target was missed 
or altered. Moreover, communicating the credibility of the central banks on the objectives and 
plausibility of communication and its proofs of reaching targets. 
Ahead of this information, the inflation targeting central bank has a liability to educate the public 
about policy tradeoff and what monetary policy cab and cannot do, as well as provoking the 
public to understand and participate in the policy since that will improve the policy makers' 
accountability to the public resulting in a better economic output. 
2.2.2 What Forums? 
The central banks have different forums to communicate with the public such as speeches, press, 
conferences, statistical release and occasional publication. 
Currently, various inflation targeting central banks issue reports including comprehensive 
evaluation of economic conditions and current information on inflation and monetary policy. 
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Section Three: success stories of some countries that have embraced IT  
3.1. Developed Countries experience  
3.1.1 Reviews about developed countries experience with inflation targeting 
The academic argument about inflation targeting regime embarked recently after New Zealand 
first adopted inflation targeting as a framework for its monetary policy in the beginning 1990 .  
And since that time, more than 22 countries have formally adopted inflation targeting and no 
country that has adopted it has detached it, even though there is still an argument around the 
contribution of inflation targeting to the whole economic performance. 
The findings of empirical studies illustrated that inflation-targeting countries have succeeded in 
eliminating inflation and its volatility and to get inflation results closer to target levels. 
Debelle and Lim (1998), have compared average inflation levels for seven inflation targeting 
countries with seven non inflation targeting countries, this study found that a sharp reduction in 
inflation in the inflation targeting group concluding that inflation targeting is beneficiary for 
countries suffering from lack of anti inflation credibility . 
Another study has concluded that inflation targeting countries are able to reach their inflation 
targets and minimize inflation volatility . 
Adding to the aforementioned studies results, another study has used cross section difference in 
difference regressions to inspect the treatment effects of inflation targeting in 20 OECD 
countries, out of which seven has adopted inflation targeting, they found that after adopting 
inflation targeting, there was an enhancement in the economic performance in these countries, 
albeit non targeting countries also witnessed enhancements at nearly the same time. 
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Thus, better economic performance reflects factors rather than monetary regime and it is 
concluded that inflation targeting does not result in a significant effect, in other words, inflation 
targeting is unrelated . 
On the other side, there are some studies that delivered different results. 
Dueker and Fischer (2006) found minimal empirical evidence that an inflation targeting 
framework performs much better than a non inflation targeting regime 
Svensson, Blum and Durlauf (2007), concluded that there is no evidence that inflation targeting 
has been harmful to growth productivity, employment or other measures of economic 
performance. 
Lin and Ye (2007),  Used matching methods to examine the treatment effects of adopting 
inflation targeting on seven industrial countries with fifteen non inflation targeting industrial 
countries as the non treatment group , they found insignificant results regarding inflation and its 
variability , 
Angeriz and Arestis (2008), Using intervention analysis found less inflation rates, well anchored 
and precise inflation expectations for both targeting and non targeting countries. 
Accordingly we can conclude that empirical studies reviews haven't succeeded in producing 
convincing evidence that IT framework enhances inflation rate and economic stability, in 
addition one of the studies pointed out that in 1990's the surrounding circumstances were having 
stagnant economic environment  " friendly period to price stability" and inflation was enjoying a 
declining trend in many countries specially developed countries  
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3.1.2 Case study : United Kingdom experience 
3.1.2.1 Rationale for choosing United Kingdom  
Since the main aim of this paper is examining Inflation Targeting in Egypt, accordingly the 
rationale behind choosing United Kingdom was due to the fact that it is having circumstances 
that are quite similar to Egypt. 
Thus through studying UK experience with Inflation Targeting, various useful lessons and 
experience can be extracted as guidance for the Egyptian case. 
3.1.2.2 What are the common circumstances between UK  and Egypt ? 
Motivation: 
United Kingdom motivation to adopt inflation targeting was aftermath of sterling's exit from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) “The foreign exchange crisis "of September 1992, 
which has resulted in the Floating and depreciation of the pound. 
Which was quite similar to Egypt motivation to adopt inflation targeting regime which was the 
CBE devaluation to the pound in March 2016, by 13% (EGP 8.85/ US dollar), which causes an 
increase in inflation, in addition to the further action that happened  in November 3, 2016, where 
the government and the CBE floated the pound, which was followed by an instantaneous 
increase in inflation where by the end of 2016, the twelve month inflation rate had stroked 23%, 
and carry on its rise through the first four months of 2017, reaching a historical high of 31% in 
April. 
Purpose: 
The purpose from adopting Inflation Targeting in United Kingdom was similar to Egypt purpose 
for adopting Inflation Targeting which was to strengthen the credibility of monetary policy and 
restore a nominal anchor. 
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Role of the Central Bank  
The bank of England did not have unilateral authority to manipulate the instrument of monetary 
policy, and due to the weak position of the bank of England before May 1997, the bank focused 
its inflation targeting efforts on: 
 Limited forecasting inflation and assessing past inflation performance 
 Bank functioned as the chancellors "Counter inflationary conscience”, where control was  
exercised by the “Chancellor of the Exchequer”. 
 Communicating to the public it monetary -policy strategy and its commitment to price 
stability, relying heavily on publications such as the "Inflation Report“. 
The role of the central bank of England was similar to the role of the central bank of Egypt, since 
Egypt central bank was not totally independent from the government in managing the monetary 
policy. 
3.1.2 .3 Learned lessons from the United Kingdom Experience: 
The United Kingdom's experience has particularly interesting lessons for inflation targeting.  
Since inflation targeting was conducted until May 1997 under severe political restrictions in 
which the government, not the central bank, sets the monetary policy tools, thus it was not clear 
which is the responsible party for conducting the decisions to shift interest rate as well as which 
party is accountable for achieving inflation targets , Was it the bank of England (which is the 
entity responsible for making public predictions or the Chancellor of the Exchequer which set the 
monetary policy tools. 
Albeit, this ambiguity causes some perplexity regarding the degree of commitment to inflation 
targets, England inflation targeting has assisted in lowering and making inflation rates more 
stable.  
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Although the weak position of the bank of England, the success of inflation targeting can be 
attributed to bank of England regarding: 
 Concentration on transparency and the efficient illustration of monetary policy strategy. 
 Creating innovative ways of communicating with the public, especially through its inflation 
report. 
 Moreover, the bank of England's success in communication has been imitated by many other 
central banks following inflation targeting. 
3.1.2.4 Recommendation for Egypt from United Kingdom Experience 
Thus, Egypt can benefit from united Kingdom in the point of even if the central bank was not the 
fully responsible entity for setting the monetary policy, England succeeded to implement 
inflation targeting, in addition the central bank was able to play a prominent role in achieving 
transparency and communicating with the public in such away that many countries have 
emulated England in it. 
Thus, even if the CBE was not fully independent in setting its monetary policy, it still can 
succeed in hitting the target; in addition CBE can supplement the government by doing 
additional roles that support the success of the target. 
3.2. Developing Countries  Experiences  
3.2.1 Reviews about developing countries experience with inflation targeting  
Lately, more than dozen developing countries have officially adopted inflation targeting  
In general , most of the developing countries whether they targeted inflation or not acted much 
better in light of growth and inflation since 2000 than during 1990's 
The evidence elaborated that those that adopted inflation targeting have witnessed much more 
enhancement than others, whether in light of inflation and growth performance 
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Lin and Ye (2007), examined the effect of inflation targeting framework on inflation an inflation 
variability in 13 developing countries that have this framework by the end of 2004 using a 
variety of propensity score matching methods . they discovered that inflation targeting has 
quantitatively and statistically significant results on reducing both inflation and inflation 
variability in these countries , on average adopting inflation targeting has led to a decline in the 
level of inflation by almost 3%  
Goncalves and Salles (2008), Concentrated especially on developing economies concluded that 
the inflation targeting effects were statistically and economically significant. 
Brito and Bystedt(2009) used a panel data to evaluate the effect of inflation target in developing 
countries and concluded that no evidence that inflation targeting framework enhances inflation 
performance and output growth in developing countries. Accordingly inflation targeting 
framework doesn’t reduce the costs of disinflation 
Eventually a group of scholars from Cambridge university derived a a painstaking research in the 
effect of inflation target , they concluded in these words We have attempted in this study to 
gauge empirical evidence for both developed and emerging countries that adopted the new 
monetary policy strategy that has come to be known as inflation targeting (IT). It may very well 
be the case that IT countries, developed and emerging, have been successful in taming and 
controlling inflation. But then there is also evidence that clearly suggests that non-IT central 
banks have also been successful in achieving and maintaining consistently low inflation rates”. 
The preceding empirical findings constructed mixed evidence in economic performance 
regarding developed and developing countries , but it is clear that developing countries has 
reaped more from inflation targeting policy than developed countries . 
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We can conclude that inflation targeting countries whether developed or emerging have been 
successful in lowering and managing , albeit there is also no evidence that proves that non 
inflation targeting countries have been successful in attaining and preserving low inflation rates  
in general , from the available evidence we can conclude that a central bank doesn’t need to 
follow inflation targeting framework to attain and preserve low inflation , especially during the 
mature stage of stationary targeting 
3.2.2 case studies from developing countries : Chile 
3.2.2.1 Rationale for choosing Chile  
The rationale behind Selecting Chilean case to be studies can be traced to the following reasons: 
It has been enjoying with similar economic circumstances as Egypt (such as the role of the 
central bank, financial position, banking regulation and government dominance) except that it 
did not suffer from a state deficit. 
Chile is considered one of the earliest  example of an emerging market country adopting  
inflation targeting in 1990, with the inflation rate in excess of 20% which is quite similar to the 
Egyptian case,  
3.2.2.2 Learned lessons from the Chilean experience: 
Since Chile was having similar economic circumstances like Egypt, although before going ahead 
on applying inflation targeting, Chile’s central bank was well aware of the severity of controlling 
inflation and reaching the target when inflation was in the double digits, thus it dealt with this 
problem through the following. 
 Chile passed new central bank legislation in 1989, thus giving independence to the central 
bank, making its main objective price stability. 
 Working on improving the fiscal policy, making the fiscal balance in surplus. 
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 Enhancing the quality of the banking regulation and supervision making it with high 
quality like industrialized countries. 
The Chilean case proved that inflation targeting can be used as a successful framework in 
emerging countries, even when initial inflation was 20%. 
Chile’s central bank succeeded in lowering its inflation, starting with targets of over 20% for 
1991 and lowering them slowly to 3.5%. 
It is worth stressing that the success of inflation targeting cannot be accredited solely to the 
Chilean central bank, though there are complementary policies such as absence of large fiscal 
deficits and strict regulation and management of the financial sector have been important to its 
success.  
One of the essential factors of Chile’s strategy success has been its gradual hardening of the 
targets across time; instead of applying firm inflation targeting that tighten the flexibility of the 
central banks leading to its failure in hitting the target.  
3.2.2.3 Drawbacks in Chile's inflation Targeting regime: 
Chile has not accomplished a full-fledged inflation targeting regime, Since the Chilean central 
bank has not released an Inflation Report, nor does it issues inflation predications; in addition 
that the  accountability mechanisms of monetary policy are weak. 
3.2.2.4 Recommendations for Egypt from the Chilean experience: 
Since Egypt and Chile are emerging countries that are having similar circumstances, accordingly 
Egypt can learn from what Chile has done to hit the target through following Chile's steps while 
adopting inflation targeting like passing new central bank legislation, improving fiscal deficit 
and enhancing banking regulations and supervision, etc. 
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Accordingly, from the Chilean case of study, we can conclude a lot of lessons that can be used as 
guidance for policy makers in Egypt.  
3.2.3 case studies from developing countries : (Czech Republic - Poland and Brazil) 
3.2.2.1 Rationale for choosing CPB Countries 
The rationale behind selecting these countries is that the economic circumstances of these 
countries in 1990's were quite close to the economic circumstances in this period , where these 
alike economic circumstances can be summarized in two folds: 
 The implementation of the economic reform program at the beginning of 1990's  
 The pegging of foreign exchange rates for long period of time 
However, the chief difference was the action of the CBE to the economic crises that took place in 
the second half of 1990's, where the CPB countries acted to these economic crises by floating 
theory local currencies and started to adopt IT framework, where the situation was not alike in 
CBE  
3.2.2.3 learned  lessons from the experience of CPB with  IT  
1-These countries were eager and aiming to attain the aim of price stability, the main intention 
beyond achieving the goal of price stability was their incentive to start preparing their economy 
for adopting IT regimes and since these countries intention was real, it has been translated 
quickly into concrete steps. 
For instance the Brazilian experience, the Brazilian CB as well as the government became 
persuaded with the idea of adopting IT as a framework for their monetary policy to attain the 
goal of price stability; accordingly the preparation and the shifting to the IT regime took place in 
a very short time that ranges from March and June 1999. 
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Till the beginning of March 1999, the Brazilian CBE was not enjoying formal instrument 
independence; in addition the anticipation capabilities were inadequate and most of the BCB 
staff was not fully aware with what IT regime was. 
2- IT was adopted to provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy, as after these counties have 
floated their currencies, the Czech Republic Central bank concluded that adopting IT framework 
is the best option to attain the goal of price stability on a forward looking basis. 
On one side, a monetary policy regime without an explicit nominal anchor was not a suitable 
option for fastening individual's expectations about the future lane of inflation, since CBs in 
these counties don’t have a track record of credibility. 
On the other side, a monetary targeting framework was not a suitable option especially after the 
liberalization of capital flows and financial markets which has weakened the relation between the 
money supply and the price levels. 
The stimulus beyond that those counties have floated their currencies was not to lose the 
effective part of their foreign reserves especially on the aftermath of the economic crisis owing 
to the rough attacks on the local currencies due to the Asian crisis as well as the external 
imbalances in their current accounts which has emerged due to pegging the foreign exchange rate 
in coincidence with high local inflation, whereby the depreciation of the local currencies took 
place. 
3- IT is challenging if the pass - through effect is high, the problem here is that the CB has to be 
credible regarding the declared inflation target in order to make it act a nominal anchor for 
individuals expectations, albeit the CB may face a high effect of the exchange rate pass through 
which may weaken the CB capability to attain the inflation target. 
Accordingly to be credible, The CB has to previously decide escape clauses for its targets. 
36 
 
After Brazil was enforced to float its currency in order not to lose the effective potion of its 
foreign reserves under the pegging of the foreign exchange rates, the BCB was scared of a higher 
level of pass-through effect in the economy, where BCB has estimated that the pass-through 
effect at that time was around 30-40% according to the predictable portion of tradable goods in 
the economy 
Even though the pass- through effect was high, the BCB didn’t maintain targeting the foreign 
exchange rates but rather it declared its stimulus to adopt IT framework, 
The motive for switching to inflation targeting was that a nominal anchor for the monetary 
policy was essentially required at that time to mitigate the panic in the economy (Fraga, 2000).  
4-Missed inflation targets can be referred to as prediction fault. , even though the escape clauses 
were elaborated explicitly in the case of the CNB (Czech Republic) and implicitly in the case of 
the NBP(Poland), the CBs in both countries missed their inflation targets several times. 
The CNB in its evaluation of 10 years of IT subtracted that the forecast faults were the reason for 
missing the majority of its targets. 
Although the NBP was less transparent concerning the actual causes beyond the missing targets, 
it took same steps as the CNB to enhance its prediction capabilities through creating more 
precise models in addition to enhancing its knowledge about monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. 
5- The CB independence was factual. The CBs in these countries enjoy legal instrument 
independence in coincidence of the non existence of both government representatives on the 
MPC as a voting member as well as there was no fiscal dominance through formal commitment 
to finance budget deficit. 
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6 Factual independence of the CB was not awarded by the government albeit it was presumed by 
the CB .The CBs, especially in the Czech Republic and Brazil, were the originators for 
suggesting IT framework to their government. Perhaps the CNB didn’t paid much effort to 
induce the government with the idea of adopting IT framework because the government was 
already stimulus by the EU accession  
3.3.4 overall learned Lessons from the experience of  countries adopted inflation targeting  
From the experience of the countries that have adopted inflation targeting, we can draw several 
lessons, which can be demonstrated hereunder: 
 There is no trade -off over the medium to long term between growth and low inflation, albeit 
evidence stresses that a credible commitment to preserve low inflation is useful for long-
term growth where this evidence stresses this relation for emerging as well as developed 
countries. 
 No country follow a strict inflation targeting regime that concentrate only on inflation even 
in the short run , but most countries pursue flexible form of inflation targeting in which short 
term conflicts between growth and inflation arising from unfavorable supply shocks are 
solved in order to lessen the employment and output volatility  
 Inflation targeting doesn’t present a magic formula for isolating a country from external 
financial troubles or other effects on the real exchange rate and external competitiveness , in 
light of this inflation targeting is not unlike other monetary policy regimes , albeit what 
inflation targeting can do is to makes use that when troubles occur , hey don’t generate an 
inflationary process that weaken long term growth 
 The experience of emerging as well as industrialized countries that have adopted inflation 
targeting proposes that inflation targeting can be useful even if not all of the requires 
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conditions are in place , noting that the least required conditions are represented in central 
bank independence , and related accountability are desirable to follow an obvious mandate. 
 The central bank needs to have an efficient tools to affect local pending and savings trend 
which requires financial markets and stagnant financial system 
 Eventually , the central bank needs to have a sufficient economic and financial data, 
analytical capabilities and a reasonable understanding of how monetary policy has an effect 
on inflation in order to react in a timely manner to inflation pressure  
 
Section 4: Egypt switching to Inflation targeting Regime is it a feasible option or not? 
4. 1 Overview about Egypt current economic situation 
Throughout the past decade, Egypt has witnessed 
relatively high rates of inflation, but starting from 
2011, the rise in consumer prices started to accelerate,  
Where during the period 2011-2015, the average rate 
of inflation was about 10% a year; such increase can 
be attributed to many factors such as the increase in 
oil prices globally, rise in the food prices, increasing 
fiscal deficit as well as the fast increase in the supply of money. 
In 2016-2017, the situation has been totally altered, 
where the inflation rate has started to move to a 
higher level. Where the the twelve-month inflation 
rate jumped from 10% in 2016 to above 30% in April 
2017, the reason for such severe increase can be 
39 
 
attributed to the following: 
During 2011-2015, the Egyptian pound has deprecated by an average of 7% a year, regardless 
the instable political situations and severe balance of payments stresses. 
In March 2016, the CBE has devaluated the pound by 13% to reach EGP 8.85/1$ leading to a 
rise in inflation in April 2016, since the devaluation has affected consumer prices through the 
increase in the import prices which is called the effect of exchange rate pass-through , where the  
Inflation continued then to increase for the next six months.  
On November 3, 2016, the Egyptian government in accordance with the CBE has announced the 
floatation of the Egyptian pound, allowing the market forces to set its foreign currency value 
leading to a depreciation of 48% in the currency s value. 
Where, the currency instantaneously has dropped to EGP 13.89/ 1$ and by November 8, 2016 it 
has witnessed further decrease to EGP 17.8/1$, since then the value of the pound has stabilized at 
around EGP 18/US dollar. 
As a result this dramatic decline in exchange rate has resulted in , an instant rise in inflation 
because of the adoption of the new floating exchange rate regime , in addition to Egypt nominal 
GDP (in US dollar) has declined from $ 350 Billion to $ 170 Billion. 
By the end of 2016, the inflation rate for the twelve months had reached 23%, and continued its 
increase until the first four months of 2017 reaching a historical increase of 31% in April. 
The floatation of the currency as well as the high inflation both are having two separate effects 
on the the Egyptian citizens, which are: 
 First: they meant a critical decrease in the purchasing power of many, as the prices of 
basic goods and imports are anticipated to increase by 200-300 % 
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 Second: it will result in a reduction in the real interest rate regardless the increase in 
nominal interest rate. 
The intuition beyond the decision to float the Egyptian  pound can be traced back to the 
following: 
The Egyptian government, the CBE and IMF have an agreement on a three year economic 
program under the IMFs extended fund facility worth 12$ billion, where this agreement has 
stated the following: 
 Repair macroeconomic stability, through minimizing external and budget deficit and 
reduce inflation 
 Increase economic growth and create jobs 
The program main prerequisites are as follows: 
 Attain extra finance of $6 billion to support the IMF loan and financing from other 
international financial institutions. 
 Lessen the fiscal deficit via a combination of tax reforms and reduce in government 
expenditures especially subsidized 
 Embracing exchange rate flexibility, thus the Egyptian pound can respond to market forces 
of demand and supply of foreign exchange Lessing the pressure in the country's foreign 
exchange reserves  
Accordingly, Egypt has pursued the following actions to meet the prerequisites of the IMF: 
 Egypt has collected external finance in the form of deposits placed in the CBE by the 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.  
 The parliament has passed the Value-Added Tax (VAT) law , in addition to Cutting 
subsidies on fuel, electricity, and particularly food. 
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 Although ,Egypt exchange rate system has been classified by the IMF as a managed 
floating, government and CBE are averse to floating preferring to manage the rate within 
a certain boundaries , nonetheless in March 2016 , the CBE has devaluated the pound by 
13% to EGP 8.85/dollar while announcing that it was planning to shift to a more flexible 
system informing that a more  depreciated pound would augment exports making them 
more competitive ,  lessen imports through rising their costs as well as attracting foreign 
investments , albeit the CBE didn’t pursue any action from March  regarding exchange 
rate , however it kept relying on a mixture of foreign  exchange intervention , increase 
interest rate , in addition to controlling foreign exchange purchase and transfers to keep 
the US  dollar value of the pound, nonetheless  due to the lack of sufficient foreign 
exchange reserves and the IMF insistence on floatation has obliged the CB to float the 
pound which took place on November 3, 2016 as aforementioned . 
After the pound, floatation, on November 2016 the IMF approved the three -year loan to 
Egypt, which worth USD 12 billion to assist the government economic reform program. 
This high inflation has negative effects on the economy such as: 
 It entails welfare costs on the society 
 Hinder efficient allocation of resources through obscuring the indicator role of relative price 
changes  
 Restrain financial development through making intermediation costly  
 Harm the poor since they don't have financial asset that can be a hedge for them against 
inflation 
 Lessen long term economic growth 
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Noteworthy that studies have pointed out that double-digit inflation has severe negative results, 
thus for many reasons Egypt has to bring its inflation rate into single digits. 
Previously, the main objective of Egypt's monetary policy was to keep the steadiness of the 
pound and a sufficient stock of foreign reserve while controlling inflation was deemed to be a 
second priority. 
However in a floating exchange rate system, the priorities should be drifted towards making 
inflation as the chief objective, since the exchange rate will be determined in the market and 
therefore there will be no stress on foreign exchange reserve as the exchange rate will be the 
factor that will equilibrate the supply and demand for foreign exchange, accordingly there is a 
quick need for altering the monetary policy regime 
The CBE has to move to an explicit inflation-targeting framework that many developed and 
developing countries have successfully implemented  
This means selecting a target for inflation, then conducting monetary policy through altering 
interest rate to reach the target. 
The inflation targeting monetary policy framework will have a number of advantages: 
 Facilitating pressure on foreign exchange reserves 
 Encourage efficient financial sector reforms 
 Improve CBE transparency of operations  
 Eliminate the government role in conducting monetary policy 
In addition, the success of the CBE depends on: 
 Full independence of the CBE  
 Full freedom to use its tools.  
 A mandate to achieve its objectives; 
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 A clear and strong coordination system between financial, monetary, and investment 
polices; 
 Transparency of the procedures. 
Worth stressing that the new monetary policy framework will not reduce inflation solely, 
however the government on the other side has to control budget deficit, which creates more 
demand burden in the economy. 
Therefore, it is expected that the combination of adopting inflation-targeting framework as well 
as reducing fiscal deficit will bring the Egyptian inflation rate to a more sustainable level, 
considering that this action should be persuade as soon as possible because the longer the delay, 
the more hard it will be to tackle inflation since it will become rooted in the system. 
4.2 History of the Monetary policy developments in Egypt since 1990's 
Since 1950s, the very essential alterations that took place in Egypt macroeconomic policy was in 
the beginning of 1990's when the Egyptian government endorsed an agreement with the IMF and 
the World bank, recognized as the economic reform and structural adjustment program 
(ERSAP), where this agreement has been initiated after the aftermath of  the significant 
economic performance of the Egyptian economy in the late 1980s , where the external debt ratio 
(% of nominal GDP) reached 131.7% in 1988 and 115.23% in 1989. 
ERSAP program has entailed two main objectives, which are: 
1. Changing the Egyptian economy into a market based economy through 4 channels: 
 Liberalizing the prices  
 FX rate 
 Interest rate  
 Trade 
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2. Stabilizing the Egyptian economy and correcting the macroeconomic policies.  
Before 1990's, the Egyptian economy was described as a centralized economy; meaning that 
there is central planning and the public sector was controlling the whole economy, therefore the 
economic policies were executed through direct orders. 
Since the government was controlling and managing most of the prices, so the pries role as a 
leading factor for economic activities was interrupted in all the economy. 
Regarding the private sector role, it was not fully ignored albeit it was very restricted (Awad, 
2002). 
Abu-Elayoun (2003) stated that the monetary authorities have followed monetary targeting 
regime in the period prior ERSAP to attain the price stability goal, however, the relation between 
the intermediate target "M2" and and the main gal of monetary authorities which is "price 
stability" was not robust. 
Moreover, during these periods (which is before ERSAP).  
 The CBE hasn’t declared any targets for the monetary growth,  
 Beside that, the foreign exchange rate was anchored against the US dollar. 
 The government was managing most of the prices of goods and services in the economy 
 In addition there was fiscal and financial domination practiced during these  
After the introduction of the ERSAP, the main goal of the monetary goal of the monetary policy 
was to attain both internal and external stability of the domestic currency aligning with the 
national objective of stimulating economic growth and creating more jobs chances  
In the period from 1990 until the start of 2003 and for long periods, the CBE was targeting the 
FX rate. 
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4.2.1 ERSAP -First Phase- (1990-1996) 
The main goals of monetary policy reforms during this phase were as follows: 
1- To put an end for the policies that have damaged the capital markets this is represented in the 
interest rate ceiling aiming to create an efficient allocation of financial resources. 
2- Restoring and enhancing the financial position, in addition to boosting competition in the 
banking system to assist in the moving of more local saving via competitive positive real interest 
rates. 
3- Isolating the CBE rule from financing treasury deficits through awarding the CB more 
independence and effective monetary policy, accordingly a market for government securities was 
enhanced; this market for treasury bills gave a significant alternative for treasure borrowing from 
CBE and this was regarded as a significant monetary instrument (Korayem, 1997). 
However, the main obstacles that have encountered the monetary authority during this phase 
were as follows:  
1- Severe lessening for credit, leading to several consequences, represented in:  
 Boosting the interest rate level, 
 Thus increasing the cost of pilling up capital for small and medium enterprises,  
 Ending up with the appreciation of exchange rate that will affect a country's export 
balance in a negative way, 
 Hence, increases a country's cost of internal debt beside imposing an upward pressure on 
prices in the long run , so the funds program strictly stressed the importance of the 
monetary authority in managing money and credit .  
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2- The instability of money demand in the majority of developing countries, in addition to the 
difficulty in managing money supply in an immature financial system were acting as a block for 
a better execution of program policies. 
3- Too much dependence on seigniorage was a reason behind conducting an independent 
monetary policy (Zaki, 2001). 
Inflation under ERSAP - First phase  
Korayem (1997) has classified that the major elements beyond the existence of severe inflation 
during this phase into demand-pull and cost push factors. 
1-Cost push elements entail: 
 Indirect taxes represented in sales tax (1990/1991), the value added tax (1995) and excise 
tax on cigarettes and other items 
 Change in prices of some goods and services (for instance the cigarettes prices , flour , 
telephone subscription , electricity , petroleum products , rail passenger prices and rail 
freight tariffs, in addition to minimizing subsidies on fertilizers and pesticides. 
 Egyptian pound devaluation in Feb. 1991, which had an effect on augmenting price of 
imported goods and increased domestic production, cost of many other goods and 
services. 
  Severe increase in interest rate that augmented cost of production and borrowing capital 
(IMF, 1992, and World bank, 1991b).  
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2-Demands pull elements represented in: 
 Severe fall in local  credit , where annual growth rate declined from 25% in 1989/1990 to 
1.5% in 1991/1992 , then lately increased to 11.7% in 1993/1994 (CBE, 1994) 
 Concerning the expected inflationary effects on aggregate demand, real wages in the 
government sector have been declining in Egypt since seventies, considering that the 
private sector wages is proportionally linked to public sector, accordingly wages could 
not be deemed an inflationary element in Egypt during the first era (IMF, 1992 and 
World bank, 1991b).  
ERSAP paid it efforts towards cost push inflation factors and delayed demand pull inflation 
factors , since cost push inflation elements are having an indirect effect on augmenting prices of 
goods and services because producers have to increase their profit margin in response to the 
increase on cost of production  
It can be inferred that hindering inflation was one of the faults of ERSAP Program, since 
inflation rate during this phase was around 13%, despite the success of fiscal reforms in 
diminishing deficit ratio of GDP from -2% to 3.4% in 1195 as well as it success in augmenting 
exports (as a % of GDP) from -10.56% in 1988 to 10.562 % in 1995. 
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4.2. Transitional period -second phase- (1996-2005) 
The main monetary goals of the CB from the period 1990 until 2005 except for 1996/1997 were: 
 To attain price stability 
 As well as exchange rate stability  
 In addition to entailing another goals such as augmenting the output level, managing 
liquidity growth, enhancing foreign competition, fostering exports and creating trust in 
the local currency (MMZ, 2007). 
To attain monetary policy objectives, the CB has used various tools which are: 
1-First tool: Decreasing Discount rate from 19.8 % in 1992 to 9 % in the beginning of 2006 to 
motivate investment  
2-Second tool: liberalization of interest rate on loans and deposits by January 1991 (Al Asrag, 
2003).   
3- Third tool: open market operation (OMO) which is a good tool to manage liquidity level in 
addition to its effect on short-term interest rate 
4-Fourth tool: Repurchasing operations of treasury bills (REPOs) to raise liquidity and to 
enhance economic growth, the value of these operations augmented to reach 209 Billion LE in 
1999/2000, and then depending on it has decreased until it was substituted by CBE notes in Aug. 
2005. 
5-Fifth tool: Required reserve ratio on domestic and foreign currency was used during this era, 
the local RRR ranged between 14-15%   and foreign RRR ranged between 10-15% (MMZ, 
2007).   
6-Six tool: Exchange rate, Starting from 1990's, Egypt applied a managed float regime, where 
the exchange rate was the nominal anchor for monetary policy. 
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 In Feb. 1991 a dual exchange rate market which comprised two markets one restricted market 
and another free market were introduced to create foreign competitiveness and to ease exchange 
rate system aiming to minimize or limit black market operations , then these two markets were 
unified in October , 1991 leading to stagnant appreciated exchange rate for the Egyptian pound 
against US during mid 1990's resulting in that IMF has requested to devaluate  20-30% of 
exchange rate , albeit Egypt government refused to avoid that appearance of severe inflation. 
Since then and up to 1998 exchange rate was traded freely in a single exchange market with 
minimal intervention from authorities to maintain exchange rates against the US dollar within a 
suitable limits.  
Worth highlighting that, the second phase was described by tight monetary policy due to the 
slowdown in the growth of M2 and the reserve. 
By 1997, the Egyptian economy embarked to feel this squeeze I liquidity due to external and 
internal shocks which are detailed hereunder: 
Internal shocks happened due to: 
 Bank lending real estate investment with no matching demand and increase in housing 
supply resulting in difficulty of loans repayment. 
 Conducting mega projects "such as Toshka" that were financed from bank deposits resulting 
in magnifying the fiscal debt. 
External Shocks were: 
 Asian financial crisis in 1997 leading to reduction in exchange rates of some Asian countries 
thus spurring importation from these countries  
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 Terrorist attack in 1996/1997 resulted in lessening tourism return from 3.6 billion to 2.9 
billion 
 Decrease I oil prices from from 15.6$ per barrel to 9.7$ affecting negatively petroleum 
exports 
 Reduction of worker remittances from abroad.  (Hassan, 2003). 
Inflation during ERSAP - Second phase 
From Jan. 2001 to Dec. 2001, the inflation rate according to the CPI and WPI was quite low 
around 2.5% and 4% respectively, accompanied by some volatility. 
The low and stagnant inflation rates  during this period can be attributed to the prevailing 
exchange rate regime at that time, where this regime isolate local prices and accordingly inflation 
from exchange rate shocks that could be moved to the WPI via import prices, and since there is 
link between WPI and CPI, any changes in WPI can be moved to CPI   
Although the prevailing exchange rate has been enjoying a limited degree of exchange pass 
through to local prices (Al Mashat, 2007), this situation has been altered with the beginning of 
2002 and in the aftermath of the first trial to start floating the exchange rate in January 2003. 
Between January 2002 and April 2004, CPI and WPI inflation pursued a sharp rising trend 
reaching a peak of 17.2% and 21.1% respectively. 
The higher inflation reflected the lagged pass- through forced due to a sequence of step 
devaluations resulting in a cumulative depreciation of 29% in the nominal EGP/USD exchange 
rate that occurred between January 2000 and December 2001 which was witnessed a further 
amplification owing to the shift to a managed float exchange rate regime in 2003  
Even though CPI inflation rate has witnessed a moderate increase compared with WPI , Central 
agency for public mobilization and statistics (CAPMAS) informed that CPI under evaluated the 
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actual rate of inflation and started a revision for the series , where after this recapping , CPI 
reached double digit inflation rate , however still less than WPI rates (Noureldin 2005 and Ugo 
2001) 
Between 2004 and the beginnings of 2005, CBE made the monetary policy more tighter to 
reduce inflation rates and it succeeded in lowering inflation rate to single digits , since the 
depreciation effects that took place in early 2003 gradually disappeared and confidence in central 
bank was enhanced. 
Between mid 2004 and beginning 2006, CPI and WPI inflation rates have declined reaching 
7.5% and 8.1% respectively. 
It can be summarized that the economic performance under the ERSAP was as follows: 
Even though Egypt has succeeded to lessen the inflation rate after the introduction of the 
ERSAP, the unemployment rate has increased and growth rate of real GDP has declined. 
Accordingly, ERSAP program has not stabilized the economy and the reason beyond ERSAP 
failure in attaining price stability can be traced back to two factors, which are: 
 The conflict between monetary policy goals (pegging the FX rate on one hand and the usage 
of an independent monetary policy to attain some other goals, which are price stability and 
economic growth). 
 severe deficit in the public budget financed via printing new money. 
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4.2.3  Towards inflation targeting-third phase-(2005) 
In Egypt, the CBE is the state entity that is responsible for conducting monetary policy as stated 
at the CBE website: 
“Law No. 88 of 2003 of the "Central Bank, Banking Sector and Monetary System" entrusts the 
Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) with the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, with 
price stability being the primary and overriding objective. The CBE is committed to achieving, 
over the medium term, low rates of inflation, which it believes are essential for maintaining 
confidence and for sustaining high rates of investment and economic growth. The Government’s 
commitment to fiscal discipline is important to achieve this objective.”        
In 2005, the central bank of Egypt has declared its intention to adopt inflation targeting as a 
framework for its monetary policy over the medium term once IT prerequisites are met. 
"To Put in place a formal inflation targeting framework to anchor monetary policy once the 
fundamental Prerequisites are met” (CBE monetary policy statement, 2005). 
The idea beyond adopting inflation targeting as a framework for the Egyptian Monetary system 
has aroused because of two reasons: 
First, The Egyptian foreign exchange markets are facing a lot of problems, thus using exchange 
rate target as a framework for monetary policy will not be a successful policy. 
Second, although using monetary policy target is possible framework, IT framework has ruled it 
out because of the following: 
 IT presents a better tool for communication with the public 
 IT presents an easy measure for CB transparency and accountability. 
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 These factors which are communication Transparency and accountability are very 
essential factors to enhance CBE credibility regarding its commitment to lessen inflation 
and to attain price stability in Egypt.  
 In addition, monetary targeting has some problems in acting as a nominal anchor because 
the relation between money and inflation is unsteady, Martinez (2008). Where Mishkin 
(2000) has summarized the lessons learned from monetary targeting in three points as 
follows:  
1-The major reason for the failure of the monetary targeting is the unsteady relationship 
between the monetary aggregates and the goal variables "i.e. inflation and nominal 
income" 
2-The way for a successful monetary targeting is communication with the public which 
improves CB transparency and accountability. 
3-Since the monetary targeting approach is rigid, thus it is not a must that it leads to 
robust inflation results 
In general, Mishkin (2000) has stressed that IT is much better than monetary targeting. 
To understand what the CBE has been doing to start implement the IT, the CBE website stated 
the following: 
“The CBE intends to adopt a full-fledged inflation targeting regime once the fundamental 
prerequisites are met. Towards that end, the CBE has achieved the following: Moving from a 
quantitative operational target (excess reserves) to a price target (overnight inter-bank rate), 
and launching a Corridor system in June 2005; issuing CBE instruments for the first time in 
August 2005 as the primary instruments for liquidity management through open market 
operations;   enhancing the role of monetary policy operations to absorb or inject liquidity in the 
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market through a publicly announced auction schedule; using a small open economy gap model 
with forward looking expectations and endogenous monetary policy response. The model's 
equations have clear micro-based motivation, derived from first order principles of rational 
agents; devising the core inflation measure. 
In the transition period, the CBE meets its inflation objectives by steering short term interest 
rates, keeping in view the developments in credit and money supply, as well as a host of other 
factors which may influence the underlying rate of inflation.”  
Worth highlighting that, the CBE issues two categories of data regarding inflation based on 
consumer price index detailed hereunder: 
 First is the headline inflation, which measures the increase in the price of goods and services 
in the consumer basket. 
 Second is the core inflation, which is the headline inflation after removing items that their 
pries are  controlled by the government, in addition to removing food items that their prices 
are volatile because their supply depends on weather and harvest conditions (e.g. fruits and 
vegetable". 
4.3 Inflation targeting Prerequisites. 
In order to start adopting inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy, there are 
various prerequisites that have to be satisfied, among them there are three major prerequisites 
that have to fulfilled first which are : 
 First, Central bank independence  
 Second, price stability should be the main goal of the monetary policy  
 Third , Forecasting capabilities  
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Beside the aforementioned prerequisites, developing countries must pay attention towards them 
lessening public debt, Martinez (2008), besides improving their financial systems to enable their 
governments to finance their public deficits without leaning on the central bank to finance the 
deficit  
If Egypt can satisfy the main prerequisites for an IT framework , it will be able to embrace IT as 
a framework for its monetary system  and as a result reaping its fruitful results , these 
prerequisites can be demonstrated as follows:  
4.3.1 First prerequisite: Factual independence of the central bank which can be attained through 
fulfilling the following three main pillars which are: 
4.3.1.1-Independence of the central bank legal instruments 
The new legislation sets that the main objective of the monetary policy is attaining the goal of 
price stability, in addition to banking system reliability within the circumstances of the general 
economic policy of the state. 
As per agreement between the government and the central bank of Egypt, the CBE is responsible 
for determining the goals of its monetary policy through a coordinating council created by a 
decree of the president of the republic. 
The CBE governor is selected by a decree of the president based on a nomination from the prime 
minster for a renewable period of 4 years and is treated as a minster in terms of his income. 
The CBE resignation is approved by a decree of the president. 
The CBE governor has two deputies assigned by a decree of the president based on the governor 
nomination for a renewable period of four years. 
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The CBE has independence of instrument, since the board of directors (BOD) or MPC of the 
CBE is the authority in charge of noticing the goals of the monetary policy via executing 
monetary, credit and banking policies  
In addition, the MPC also sets the needed tools to attain the goals represented in the tools that the 
monetary policy has to pursue, the organization of credit and discount rates, the regulatory and 
supervisory standards to assure the reliability of the financial position of banks, and the 
organization of auctions and tenders. 
4.3.1.2- Government representatives as a voting members in the MPC  
Egypt MPC entails government representatives as voting members, as it comprises 14 members, 
including: 
 2 deputy governors 
 Chairman of the capital market authority  
 3 members representing the ministries of finance, planning and foreign trade 
 8 experts in monetary , financial , banking , legal , economic affairs appointed by the 
president of the republic for a renewable period of 4 years 
 Non existence of fiscal domination meaning that the central bank is not obliged to finance 
the government budget deficits, at the same time the financial market should be more 
profound to absorb the public debt represented in treasury bills 
4.3.1.3-The CBE responsibility to finance budget deficits: 
The CBE is acting as a financial consultant and agent for the government, therefore the CBE 
implements banking transactions related to the government and public legal representatives, in 
addition to executing internal an external finance with banks based on the conditions determined 
by the MPC 
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The CBE presents finance to the government based on their demand to cover the seasonal deficit 
of the general budget with amount not exceeding 10% of the average revenues of the budget . 
The duration of this finance is three months and can be renewed for additional similar periods, 
with a max. of 12 months. 
The finance conditions are set based on an accord between the ministry of finance and the CBE, 
in addition, the CBE has to guarantee the finance and credit facilities granted to the public legal 
representatives from banks, financial institutions and international institutions. 
For the time being, the main shortcoming of the macroeconomic policy in Egypt is the 
performance of the general budget, though Egypt budget deficit (% of GDP) was acceptable in 
the period from 1995-1998, it has been amplified during the consecutive periods after 2002. 
Accordingly, The higher ratio of budget deficit in coincidence with the the presence of 
government representatives in the MPC, beside the legal commitment of the CBE to finance 
budget deficits represented the highest danger for both the CBE's independence and the 
macroeconomic stability in Egypt. 
In a nutshell, even though the new legislation set the main goal of the monetary policy to be the 
attainment of the goal of price stability and awarded the CBE legal instrument independence, the  
presence of of government representatives as  a voting members on the MPC in addition to 
forcing the CBE to present finance to the government are two enough factors to weaken the de 
facto independence of the CBE , hence , the legal instrument independence awarded to the 
central bank of Egypt is shallow and haven't exceeded the de jure independence. 
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4.3.2 Second prerequisite price stability should be the main goal of the monetary policy which 
entails two main factors: 
4.3.2.1 CB should not target any other variables than the rate of inflation because if the CB 
targets any other variables beside inflation, the CB will not be able to achieve the inflation target 
due to: 
 Either the goals will be contradicting in the short term  
 Or due to the inflationary expectations resulting from the uncertainty vaporizing from the 
lack of credibility of the CB in attaining inflation targets. 
4.3.2.2 CB should be transparent and clear to the public regarding the exceptions of the inflation 
targeting "the CB should declare inflation targeting escape clauses  
There are various alternatives available to CBE to declare IT escape clauses when deciding to 
adopt IT, which are: 
 Explicit declaration of escape clauses for IT as in the case of Czech Republic 
 Defining shocks and setting the range and the length of a shock that will make the CB 
react , as in the Poland  
 Using wide range for its inflation targets with no need to declare any escape clauses like 
Brazil 
4.3.3 Third prerequisite: Capability of Egypt to  forecast inflation targeting: 
Forecasting capabilities entails three main elements, which are: 
 A model for inflation foreseeing and inflation projection has to be prepared 
 The CB has to have an obvious idea about monetary policy transmission mechanism and 
their related lags 
 Comprehensive, modernized and high quality data have to be on hand 
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Concerning the first and second elements  
Al-Mashat, 2008 (pp. 25-26) introduced data about the situation of inflation modeling and 
foreseeing inside the CBE, and since this information is not accessible to any researcher in a 
normal way, thus it raises a question concerning the degree of disclosure in the CBE which is a 
keystone of a successful IT regime. 
In addition, the structure of the CPI core inflation by CBE may act as a valuable tool for the 
MPC to follow up and appraise the inflation behavior; however, it will be risky if the CBE is 
intending to use it for the purpose of IT, since the CBE does not have a track record of 
credibility. 
The CPI core inflation or any other price index that will be used for the purpose of IT has to be 
estimated by a separate entity which is CAPMAS in the Egyptian case. 
These issues entails the relationship between money supply and prices, the stability of the 
demand for the money function n, the exchange rate pass through effect, the exchange rate trend, 
the relative significance of monetary policy transmission channels and the related time interval, 
the inflation rate that have to be targeted without resulting in an outbreak of public debt, inflation 
foreseeing, and inflation projection under various scenarios for supply and demand shocks. 
The CBE should have various models under various methodologies for each separate issue to 
compare and conclude precise data.  
Concerning the third element: 
 Through depending on the data quality assessment framework (DQAF), the IMF (2005) 
evaluated the quality of data in Egypt, where their evaluation included the national accounts, the 
price indices, the public finance, the money and the balance of payment statistics. 
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Although there were different drawbacks in many areas, the most defects in the Egyptian data 
were noticed in the accuracy and reliability, serviceability and the accessibility. 
Regarding data accuracy and reliability this was connected to the national accounts and the price 
indices organized by the ministry of planning and the CAPMAS. 
For data serviceability, this issue entailed the fact that the distribution of macroeconomic 
statistics does not in all cases match with the users needs and there is no general control 
concerning the progress and coordination of macroeconomic statistics. 
Concerning data accessibility issue included the hardness of the availability of data between all 
interested parties similarly and instantaneously. 
From the aforementioned main prerequisites, we can conclude the following: 
1- The CBE is not factually independent albeit the new legislations which stated that the main 
objective of  monetary policy is to attain price stability and accordingly the CBE was granted 
legal instrument independence, however  the presence of of government representatives as a 
voting members on the MPC  and the enforcement of the CBE to present finance to the 
government are two sufficient factors to weaken the meaning of de facto independence of the 
CBE 
2-There are many evidences that support that the attitude of CBE in adopting IT is quiet similar 
to the attitude of most of the emerging countries as Egypt will be adopting IT framework while 
implicitly targeting FX rates, so under this scenario, there is great probability that inflation 
targets will be missed specifically in the first stages of applying IT framework. 
3- The current level of information of CBE about some significant issues that have to be tackled 
prior adopting IT regime is not pleasing and the quality of the current available information is 
not likely to sustain the adoption of an IT framework  
61 
 
In that respect, we can conclude that the fulfillment of IT prerequisites for an IT regime in Egypt 
is still unfavorable, therefore Egypt still not ready to adopt an IT framework. 
4.4 Inflation targeting implementation. 
To implement IT, the central bank must follow the following steps: 
Step (1) the mandate of the central bank has to explicitly declared to the public and it must be 
achieving price stability as the main goal of monetary policy  
 The central bank must explicitly announce that its mandate is to achieve price stability as 
a primary goal for monetary policy. 
 The central banks have to create credibility to achieve an effective monetary policy. 
 Worth highlighting that price stability doesn’t mean zero inflation, nonetheless it I the 
ability of a central bank in controlling inflation 
Step (2) Determining which price index will be utilized.  
 Most common price indexes used by the central banks use either CPI and Core inflation, 
which is the CPI after removing some elements such as food prices and energy prices. 
 The used CPI has to enjoy two features which are precise, timely and easily understood 
by the public, in addition it has to permit for price shocks or one time shifts that don’t 
affect the inflation trend. 
Step (3) Determining the inflation target.  
There are three ways for CB to determine their inflation targets which are: 
 First: The point target which means setting the inflation target at a certain number  
 (For instance, in Canada, Norway, and United Kingdom place their inflation targets at 
2%, 2.5%, and 2%, respectively).  
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 Second: The point interval of inflation, in this way the CB determines inflation target at a 
certain point with a certain interval (For example, in Sweden, Brazil, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Peru, and Poland the inflation targets were set at 2(+/-1), 4.5(+/-2), 
3(+/-1), 3(+/-1), 3(+/-1), 3(+/-1), 2(+/-1), and 2.5(+/-1), respectively. ) 
 Third: The tolerance range, in this way the CB determines the inflation target between 
two points For example, in Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, and South Africa 
inflation targets were set at 2-3, 1-3, 5-6, and 3-6, respectively. Martinez (2008).  
Step (4) Determining the time horizon of the target  
Based on historical experiences, it is essential for the central banks that adopt IT to follow it in a 
flexible form. 
Step (5) anticipating the inflation rates. 
Central banks have to pursue models through which they can anticipate the inflation rates in the 
future. 
This step is very crucial in the process of executing IT as a framework for monetary policy due 
to the time lag between the monetary policy actions and their effects on price levels . 
The core element of IT is that it is not based on addressing the price level, instead it is based on 
addressing the expected price level. 
Step (6) setting the policy action.  
Central banks have to pursue policy actions to be used if anticipated inflation diverges from the 
targeted inflation, here the central banks should be independent in choosing the policy tools to 
attain the inflation target that is known "CB tool independence". 
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Step (7) deciding the channels through which the public will be communicated.  
CBs have to decide how they will communicate with public in order to create credibility, 
considering that compromising flexibility with credibility is very crucial issue that the success of 
IT depends on,  
Monetary policy committees, policy releases and news briefs are the most famous instruments to 
communicate with public 
4.5  Policy Recommendations for Egypt to embrace IT as a framework for its monetary 
system. 
1-The CBE must communicate its mandate in an efficient way with the public to convince them 
that its main goal is achieving price stability as the main goal for its monetary policy , thus 
paving the way for achieving credibility  
2-CBE has to use the core inflation instead of headline inflation while adopting it inflation 
targeting to hedge the the severe fluctuations in the headline inflation due to temporary and 
unexpected movements in some elements of the CPI components. 
3-It worth recommending the CBE based on international experience has to use a point interval 
or tolerance range instead of certain point as an inflation target , since the former grants 
flexibility for the CBE to attain other targets such as output growth and exchange rate stability 
over the short term, Nonetheless, in order to attain credibility, in case the CBE has to amend the 
short term inflation targets to adopt some shocks in the economy, the CB must clarify that for the 
public through stating that it still commits to attain the inflation target over the medium term 
while making it clear why inflation diverges from the target, in addition to stating the actions that 
will be taken to attain the target over the medium term. 
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4-Once the CBE fully adopts IT, it has to collaborate with the Egyptian government in setting the 
inflation targets, but the CBE has to be independent in executing the the monetary policy 
measures that attain inflation target, the essentiality of the coordination between the CBE and the 
Egyptian government in setting the inflation target comes from the essence of the agreement 
between monetary policy and fiscal policy  
5 According to the international experience, it is recommended for the CBE when it fully adopt 
IT to set the inflation target over the medium term, which gives flexibility for the CBE in 
supporting the government in attaining other other economic goals such as output growth and 
employment. 
6-Although it is not recommended to alter the inflation target over the medium term, the CBE 
may need to alter its medium term inflation target. in case the CBE needs to do so, it must have 
justifiable  reasons for doing so and it has to convince the public  that the inflation targeting 
alteration is due to alteration in the baseline fundamentals noting that price stability is the main 
goal of the monetary policy , if the CBE fails to do so , its credibility will be damaged and the 
whole policy of IT will fail  
7- Before the CBE adopts IT over the medium term, it is recommended that a new law has to be 
issued to compromise some measures that assure accountability of the CBE towards achieving 
inflation target; at least three measures have to state in the new law. 
 First, the appearance of the CBE governor before the Egyptian parliament to discuss the 
monetary policy and the situation of inflation target, where this appearance has to be at 
least once every quarter. 
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 Second, the CBE has to write to the prime minister at least one open letter every quarter 
to clarify the current situation of inflation target and the future plan to achieve inflation 
within its target. 
 Third, the CBE governor maintain in his position based on the CBE ability in achieving 
the inflation target and it sufficient communication with the the public 
8-For better implementation for IT , the Egyptian government must enhance the budget deficit, 
which means the collaboration between the CBE and the Egyptian government is very crucial for 
the success of IT policy    
9- Another recommendation is enhancing the the the financial market infrastructure, as the 
current financial market infrastructure in Egypt is not robust enough to widen the scope for the 
independence of the monetary policy. 
10- Improvement of data availability and credibility to be used as a precise guidance in 
conducting inflation targets expectations.           
Section 5 : Data and Methodology: 
This section will examine whether Egypt has a great probability to start adopting Inflation 
targeting or not?  
To examine this, this paper employs three models, which are a probit model - Logit model - 
extreme value model. 
Where the dependent variable (Y) is inflation targeting which is a dummy variable that records 
the value of one for countries that are adopting inflation targeting and zero for non-inflation 
targeting countries. 
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This model employs 5 variables which are (Past inflation - Openness of the economy - Fiscal 
deficit- Exchange rate and GDP) to investigate which variable has a significant effect on 
embracing inflation targeting. 
The equation of our model can be elaborated as follows: 
Inflation Targeting (Y) =    +   Past inflation +    Openness of the economy +    
Fiscal deficit. +    Exchange rate +    GDP +   
In this model,  
 Past inflation is measured through using CPI  
 Openness of the economy is calculated via this equation: 
              
   
 
 Fiscal deficit: it is calculated through this equation= Government Revenues- Government 
Expenses  
 
Data Source: 
Data used in this model has been extracted from the World Bank (WB) and international 
monetary fund (IMF). 
Data set consists of 93 developing and developed countries that are examined for the years 1980 
until 2018 
In this model for each country that have adopted inflation targeting, we define the starting year 
of the applying inflation targeting to be the year of   IT adoption. 
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The treatment group comprises 28 industrial and emerging countries that have adopted 
inflation targeting, where those countries and the date of their adoption to inflation targeting can 
be illustrated in b/m table. 
# Country year of adoption # Country year of adoption 
1 Albania 2009 15 Korea 1998 
2 Armenia 2006 16 Mexico 2001 
3 Australia 1993 17 New Zealand 1990 
4 Brazil 1999 18 Norway 2001 
5 Canada 1991 19 Peru 2002 
6 Chile 1991 20 Philippines 2002 
7 Colombia 1999 21 Poland 1999 
8 Czech Republic 1997 22 Romania 2005 
9 Ghana 2007 23 Serbia 2006 
10 Guatemala 2005 24 South Africa 2000 
11 Hungary 2001 25 Sweden 1995 
12 Iceland 2001 26 Thailand 2000 
13 Indonesia 2005 27 Turkey 2006 
14 Israel 1997 28 United Kingdom 1992 
The Control group: entails 65 countries from developed as well as emerging countries that have 
not adopted non- inflation targeting. 
The Model Hypothesis: 
Null hypothesis:      (meaning no effect so it is insignificant) 
Alternative hypothesis:    0 (has an effect so it is significant) 
Worth highlighting that:    is a set that comprises                            
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Model Results: 
1-Binary Probit Model 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Constant 0.146070 0.098276 1.486321 0.1372 
Openness of economy -6.87 1.01 -6.797197 0.0000 
Fiscal deficit  -6.71 4.84 -1.386499 0.1656 
Past inflation -4.452418 0.695872 -6.398326 0.0000 
GDP -0.161614 0.288384 -0.560412 0.5752 
Exchange rate 4.95 3.65 1.353866 0.1758 
     
     
Result of the model: 
Inflation Targeting (Y) =    +   Past inflation +    Openness of the economy +    
Fiscal deficit. +    Exchange rate +    GDP +   
=0.14  -4.45 past inflation - 6.87 Openness of the economy -6.71 fiscal deficit +4.95 exchange 
rate -0.16 GDP 
2-Logit Model 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
Constant 0.278683 0.169912 1.640161 0.1010 
Openness of economy -1.18 1.81 -6.500237 0.0000 
Fiscal deficit  -1.08 8.48 -1.277828 0.2013 
Past inflation -7.343023 1.212244 -6.057379 0.0000 
GDP -0.242159 0.498346 -0.485925 0.6270 
Exchange rate 8.16 6.14 1.329057 0.1838 
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Result of the model: 
Inflation Targeting (Y) =    +   Past inflation +    Openness of the economy +    
Fiscal deficit +    Exchange rate +    GDP +   
=0.27  -7.3 past inflation - 1.18 Openness of the economy -1.08 fiscal deficit +8.16 exchange rate 
-0.24GDP 
3- Binary Extreme Value 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     Constant 0.455061 0.096963 4.693137 0.0000 
Openness of economy -6.27 9.25 -6.782586 0.0000 
Fiscal deficit  -6.53 4.98 -1.312346 0.1894 
Past inflation -4.355539 0.657897 -6.620397 0.0000 
GDP -0.203333 0.272386 -0.746486 0.4554 
Exchange rate 4.71 3.68 1.281554 0.2000 
     
     
Result of the model: 
Inflation Targeting (Y) =    +   Past inflation +    Openness of the economy +    
Fiscal deficit +    Exchange rate +    GDP +   
= 0.45  -4.35 past inflation - 6.27 Openness of the economy -6.5 fiscal deficit +4.7 exchange rate 
-0.20 GDP  
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From the estimated results in our three model , it can be concluded that : 
The relation between inflation targeting and past inflation is negatively correlated and significant 
as expected, indicating that as long as past inflation is high  ,thus  the probability to adopt 
inflation targeting  will be much harder , thus it will be hard to target inflation that was already 
high in the past  . 
The relation between inflation targeting and openness of the economy is also negatively 
correlated and significant, which means that the more is the openness of the economy , the less 
will be the probability of the success of adopting inflation targeting ,because as long as the 
economy of a country is more open , that’s  mean that the economy is more competitive and 
accordingly subject to the exchange rate pass through effect , so it will be difficult to target 
inflation. 
The relation between inflation targeting and government deficit is negatively correlated and 
insignificant  meaning that government deficit doesn’t have an effect on the decision of adopting 
inflation , in addition the negative relation means that the more is the government deficit, the less 
will be the probability of the success of adopting inflation targeting, because as government 
deficit increases it may lead the government to increase the money supply  through printing 
money to pay the debt  leading to more inflationary effects. 
The relation between inflation targeting and exchange rate is  positively correlated as per model 
results and insignificant  meaning that exchange rate doesn’t have an effect on the decision of 
adopting inflation, beside that the positive relation indicates that as exchange rate increases , the 
possibility of embracing inflation targeting increases . 
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The relation between inflation targeting and GDP  is negatively correlated and insignificant  
meaning that GDP doesn’t have an effect on the decision of adopting inflation. 
To sum up ,the estimated results show that the openness of the economy and past inflation are 
the only significant two variables having an effect on  the decision of adopting inflation targeting 
with negative correlations ,which means that as they  increases  the possibility to adopt IT 
decreases . 
For Fiscal deficit ,exchange rate and GDP growth rate , they are having   insignificant effect on 
the adoption of inflation targeting  ,accordingly inflation targeting adoption is not affected by the 
fiscal deficit and exchange rate effect as well GDP. 
Egypt's probability to adopt IT as aframework for its monetary system 
1-Probit Model 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
fg
ha
ni
st
an
 - 
80
A
lb
an
ia
 -
 1
6
A
ng
ol
a 
- 
13
A
rg
en
tin
a 
- 
10
A
us
tr
al
ia
 -
 0
7
B
ah
ra
in
 -
 0
4
B
el
gi
um
 -
 0
1
B
en
in
 - 
98
B
ol
ivi
a 
- 
95
B
ra
zil
 -
 9
2
B
ul
ga
ria
 -
 8
9
B
ur
un
di
 -
 8
6
C
am
bo
di
a 
- 8
3
C
en
tr
al
 A
fr
ic
an
 R
ep
ub
lic
 - 
80
C
ha
d 
- 1
6
C
ol
om
bi
a 
- 1
3
C
ôt
e 
d'
Iv
oi
re
 - 
10
C
yp
ru
s 
- 
07
D
en
m
ar
k 
- 
04
E
gy
pt
 - 
01
E
st
on
ia
 -
 9
8
Fi
nl
an
d 
- 
95
G
ha
na
 -
 9
2
G
ua
te
m
al
a 
- 
89
H
un
ga
ry
 -
 8
6
In
do
ne
si
a 
- 
83
Is
ra
el
 -
 8
0
Jo
rd
an
 -
 1
6
K
uw
ai
t -
 1
3
Li
by
a 
- 
10
M
al
ay
si
a 
- 0
7
M
au
rit
iu
s 
- 0
4
M
or
oc
co
 -
 0
1
N
ic
ar
ag
ua
 -
 9
8
N
or
w
ay
 -
 9
5
P
er
u 
- 
92
P
ol
an
d 
- 
89
R
om
an
ia
 -
 8
6
S
er
bi
a 
- 
83
S
lo
va
k 
R
ep
ub
lic
 -
 8
0
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
- 
16
S
pa
in
 - 
13
S
w
ed
en
 -
 1
0
S
yr
ia
 -
 0
7
To
go
 -
 0
4
Tu
ni
si
a 
- 
01
Tu
va
lu
 - 
98
U
zb
ek
is
ta
n 
- 
95
Zi
m
ba
bw
e 
- 9
2
Probability of inflation targeting
 
 
 
 
   
72 
 
2-Logit Model 
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3- Binary Extreme Value 
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The three above graphs illustrate that the probabilities of all the countries under study in 
dopting inflation targeting , while focusing on Egypt , where we have indicated that  the 
probability that Egypt can adopt inflation targeting is less than mainly less 40%  which is 
very weak . 
Egypt likelihood regarding adopting IT  
 
Egypt Target Countries Non-target countries 
Logit Model 0.411021 0.972253 0.616448 
Probit Model 0.408857 0.985646 0.609608 
Gompit Model 0.406671 0.917172 0.580716 
 
This table has  illustrated the probabilities of inflation targeters countries as well as non -
inflation targeters countries and compare ]Egypt to them to conclude whether it is much 
closer to targeters or non targeters  using our three models which are Logit ,Probit and 
Gompit . 
It is concluded that estimated indicators have shown that Egypt willingness to target 
inflation is less likely to happen , since it is estimate probability probability is around 40%,  
which is even less than the probabilities of non inflation targeters countries thus it much 
closer to non -target counties than targeters countries. 
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Conclusion: 
The conclusion of this study is that inflation targeting has become the mastering remedy for 
monetary policy that most of the developing and developed countries have adopted to reduce 
inflation and foster economic and price stability. Although there is no clear evidence 
proving that inflation targeting regime is the effective monetary policy framework for 
attaining price stability. 
By  having a closer look at the Egyptian case to answer our research question which is " Is 
Egypt ready to embark inflation targeting as a framework for its monetary policy " , we 
concluded that Egypt is not ready yet to embrace inflation targeting  because  it still haven't 
fulfill any of the main prerequisites of IT represented in 1-the CBE is  not factually 
independent albeit the new legislations has set that price stability should be the primary goal 
of  the monetary policy and granted the CBE legal instrument independence but due to the 
existence of government representatives in the MPC and CBE finance to the government 
deficit have underpin the meaning of de facto independence of the CBE ,2- in addition the 
CBE may announce that it is explicitly adopting IT while implicitly they are targeting FX 
rates which leading to the missing of inflation targets especially in the first stages of 
applying IT 3-the current level of CBE knowledge about some significant issues that have to 
be handled before adopting IT is not satisfactory in addition the poor data quality that is not 
likely to assist the adoption of IT regime . 
Beside that that our three models results have assured that  , as the estimated results have 
shown that the probability that Egypt can embrace IT is less than 40% which is very low 
percent comparing to the probability of inflation targeters countries which is around 90%. 
In the light of these results, the study concludes that the Egypt willingness to embrace 
inflation targeting still unsatisfactory. 
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